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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XVIII JUNE, 1933 No. 4
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, SECTIONS 512-525,*
WITH MISSOURI ANNOTATIONSf
BY TYRRELL WILLIAMS
ILLEGAL BARGAINS
TOPIC A. DEFINITION.
Section 512. DEFINITION OF ILLEGAL BARGAIN.
A bargain is illegal within the meaning of the Restatement of
this Subject if either its formation or its performance is criminal,
tortious, or otherwise opposed to public policy.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. In Haggerty v.
St. Louis Ice Mfg. Co. (1898) 143 Mo. 238, 44 S. W. 1114, the sub-
ject matter of the bargain, storing of game out of season, was
criminal under Missouri Statutes and so the bargain was not a
lawful contract. Missouri courts apply the same test when the
subject matter of the alleged contract involves the commission of
a federal crime. Tandy v. Elmore-Cooper Live Stock Comm. Co.
(1905) 113 Mo. App. 409, 87 S. W. 614, inclosing the public do-
main. In Bank of Dexter v. Simmons (Mo. App. 1918) 204 S. W.
837, there was a bargain to commit a tort, namely, fraud on the
stockholders of the bank, and so the bargain was unenforceable.
Cooley Credit Co. v. Townsend (1908) 132 Mo. App. 390, 111
S. W. 894, was a bargain against public policy, namely, assign-
* Copyright, 1932, The American Law Institute.
Copyright, 1933, Washington University. Previous sections of the Re-
statement, similarly annotated, will be found in the ST. Louis LAw Ruvinw
for December, 1930, February, 1931, June, 1931, December, 1931, December,
1932, February, 1933, and April, 1933.
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ment by a policeman of his salary, and therefore not a valid con-
tract.
TOPIC B. BARGAINS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
Section 513. DEFINITION OF A BARGAIN IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
A bargain is in restraint of trade when its performance would
limit competition in any business or restrict a promisor in the
exercise of a gainful occupation.
Annotation:
This Section is carefully formulated so as to include not only
(1) bargains in restraint of trade which are illegal, but also (2)
bargains in restraint of trade which are legal, and at the same
time to exclude (3) bargains which restrain activities outside the
domain of trade.
Illustrations of (1) can be found in: State ex rel. Barrett 'V.
.BoeckelerLumber Co. (1923) 301 Mo. 445, 256 S. W. 175, bargain
between nineteen lumber dealers to fix prices; State ex inf. Had-
ley v. Standard Oil Co. (1909) 218 Mo. 1, 116 S. W. 902, bargain
between three oil producers to prevent competition by dividing
up state between two and deceiving public into thinking that third
was a competitor of other two; Finck v. Schneider Granite Co.(1905) 187 Mo. 244, 86 S. W. 213, bargain legal on face made il-
legal by other bargains; Pope-Turnbo v. Bedford (1910) 147 Mo.
App. 692, 127 S. W. 426, bargain between manufacturer and re-
tailer with promise for exclusive use of former's product.
Illustrations of (2) can be found in: State cx rel. Barrett V.
Carondelet Planing Mill Co. (1925) 309 Mo. 353, 274 S. W. 780,
agreement among competing planing mill owners for exclusive
use of standard forms in submitting bids; Home Telephone Co.
v. Sarcoxie Light & Tel. Co. (1911) 236 Mo. 114, 139 S. W. 108,
agreement between telephone companies for exchanging facilities
in long distance service; Presbury v. Fisher (1853) 18 Mo. 50,
valid bond with restrictive covenant given by sellers of newspaper
as part consideration for sale.
The possibility of (3) is recognized in: State ex inf. Crow v.
Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. (1899) 152 Mo. 1, 52 S. W. 595, where it
was held that a so-called "social club" was a "plain, palpable, but
bungling . . . agreement . . . organized to evade the anti-
trust laws of Missouri, but wholly inefficient for such a purpose."
See also Valley Spring Hog Ranch Co. 'v. Plagmann (1920) 282
Mo. 1, 220 S. W. 1, city ordinance contracting for disposal of gar-
bage is primarily a health measure and not the establishment of
"a business of any kind".
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Section 514. WHEN A BARGAIN IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE IS
ILLEGAL.
A bargain in restraint of trade is illegal if the restraint is un-
reasonable.
Annotation:
Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. U. S. (1911) 221 U. S. 1, 55 L. Ed.
619, 31 S. Ct. 502, is authority for the following propositions: (1)
at common law a bargain in restraint of trade to be illegal must
be unreasonable; (2) at common law any bargain which makes
possible an undue restraint on trade with possible injury to the
public is an unreasonable bargain and illegal; (3) the Federal
Anti-trust Statute of 1890 merely adopted the common law and
applied it to interstate commerce with certain important changes
in procedure. This Section 514 is undoubtedly in accord with
federal law.
In Missouri an anti-trust statute containing drastic penalties
was adopted in 1889 and amplified in 1891, 1895, 1897 and 1907.
The present statute is R. S. Mo. 1929, Sections 8700 to 8744. For
history of Missouri legislation see: Co-operative Live Stock Com.
Co. v. Browning (1914) 260 Mo. 324, 168 S. W. 934 and State ex
inf. Barker v. Armour Packing Co. (1915) 265 Mo. 121, 176 S. W.
382.
The rule of reason recognized by the Restatement and firmly
established as federal law was supposed by many lawyers to be
approved in a case arising under the Missouri Statute, namely,
State ex inf. Major v. International Harvester Co. (1911) 237 Mo.
369, 141 S. W. 672, where the court said: "The Supreme Court
of the United States held that the ac of Congress which prohibits
contracts in restraint of trade was to be construed in the light of
reason, and when so construed it did not forbid the making of
every contract that had for its purpose a restraint of trade, but
only such as had for its purpose an unreasonable restraint of
trade." In a later case, State ex rel. Barrett v. Boeckeler Lumber
Co. (1923) 301 Mo. 445,256 S. W. 175, it was announced that our
Supreme Court was not committed "to the theory of legality of
contracts in reasonable restraint of trade." The same case ap-
parently approved this comment quoted from an earlier case:
"Even if that was not the common law, yet there is nothing in
either the State or Federal Constitution which prevents the en-
actment of a statute prohibiting the making of all contracts in
restraint of trade, whether reasonable or unreasonable." The
Court, construing what is now R. S. Mo. 1929, Section 8703,
added: "When the Legislature has denounced all agreements, un-
derstandings, etc., which tend to lessen full competition, or which
Washington University Open Scholarship
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tend to increase market prices, we may not construe such language
to mean: All agreements which tend to lessen competition, ex-
cept those which do not unreasonably lessen competition, and all
agreements which tend to increase prices, except those which do
not unreasonably increase prices, shall be deemed against public
policy and void. Other courts upon different statutes may have
been justified in applying the 'rule of reason'. We will not under-
take to distinguish such cases. Under the clear and explicit
language of our statute, there is no room for such construction."
In the case last cited the combination undoubtedly was unrea-
sonable, when tested by the Federal law, because it tended to
injure the public by raising prices for an essential commodity.
The same may be said of each one of the other successful prosecu-
tions under the Missouri Anti-Trust Statute. See particularly:
State ex inf. Major v. International Harvester Co. (1911) 237
Mo. 369, 141 S. W. 672; State ex inf. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co.
(1909) 218 Mo. 1, 116 S. W. 902; State ex inf. Crow v. Armour
Packing Co. (1903) 173 Mo. 356, 73 S. W. 645.
There is probably no practical variance between the Restate-
ment and Missouri statutory law, but there is a theoretical vari-
ance because in Missouri the statutory language alone is to be
made the test without any modifying use of the words reasonable
or unreasonable. If R. S. Mo. 1929, Sections 8701, 8702 and
8703, are to be regarded as particular specifications of the more
general principle formulated in R. S. Mo. 1929, Section 8700, then
there is certainly no practical variance because the acts specified
in R. S. Mo. 1929, Sections 8701, 8702 and 8703, are in unreason-
able restraint of trade, according to the Restatement, and there-
fore illegal. In a case decided after the Missouri repudiation of
the federal rule of reason, State ex rel. Barrett v. Carondelet Plan,
ing Mill Co. (1925) 309 Mo. 353, 274 S. W. 780, which involved
an unsuccessful prosecution of competing manufacturers for hav-
ing bargained to submit bids for St. Louis work, on agreed stand-
ard forms, the Court, when discharging the respondents on the
facts, found there was a "reasonable explanation" of at least one
of the practices relied upon by the prosecution.
Apart from the Missouri Anti-Trust Statute, that is to say,
under Missouri common law, the rule of reason is recognized. In
Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (1881) 73 Mo. 389, the
Court held a certain contract with a restrictive covenant to be
legal and stated: "We cannot say from anything appearing in
the contract that such limitation is unreasonable, and it is not,
therefore, obnoxious to the rule." This language was expressly
approved in Finck v. Schneider Granite Co. (1905) 187 Mo. 244,
86 S. W. 213, where the court, holding a certain bargain illegal,
said: "In determining the validity at common law of such com-
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binations and contracts which are essential parts of them, the
true test is whether they afford fair and just protection to the
parties or whether they are so broad as to 'interfere with the in-
terests of the public'." Angelica, Jacket Co. v. Angelica (1906)
121 Mo. App. 226, 98 S. W. 805, involved a certain bargain in re-
straint of trade attached to the sale of a business. In holding
that the restraint was legal the Court approved the following
passage from a standard author: "The existing state of the law,
as deduced from the latest English and American authorities, is
that which recognizes and enforces covenants of this nature, even
though the restraint is general throughout an entire State or
country, provided it is founded upon a sufficient consideration and
is not unreasonable in view of the nature and extent of the busi-
ness of the covenantee." Gordon v. Mansfield (1900) 84 Mo. App.
367, involved the sale by a physician of his practice and good will
with a restrictive covenant which was held to be legal, the court
saying: "If there is a reasonable limitation only and a considera-
tion capable of supporting the agreement, it will be upheld." In
Mallinckrodt Chem. Wks. ,v. Nemnich (1899) 83 Mo. App. 6, the
court said: "A contract (for a valid consideration) of sale of a
secret process for the manufacture or composition of drugs, of
other matter or of machinery, used in trade, which restricts the
vendor from using the same, or imparting his knowledge to
others, or selling the same article, is a reasonable restriction when
necessary for the protection of the vendee, and the article is not
one of prime necessity to the general public."
From all the cases decided by the Missouri reviewing courts
and by the Supreme Court of the United States, during the past
seventy-five years, it is quite apparent that the final test as to the
legality of any bargain in restraint of trade is the test of public
welfare and this is true whether the action is at common law, in
equity or under a statute. If the welfare of the public is actually
injured or potentially threatened the courts will declare the bar-
gain illegal. If the welfare of the public is not affected, the bar-
gain will be upheld because within the domain of the individual
liberty of the contracting parties. Possibly too much attention
has been paid to the words reason, reasonable and unreasonable.
If reasonable is defined as meaning consistent with the public wel-
fare, then this Section 514 is in full accord with Missouri law,
both unwritten and statutory. In the leading Missouri case on this
topic Presbury v. Fisher (1853) 18 Mo. 50, the court said: "There
is no practical man who would not smile at the conceit that the pub-
lic welfare would sustain an injury by enforcing an obligation like
that involved in the present case." For additional cases where wel-
fare of the public was considered, see: Berschv.Fire Underwriters
Ass'n of St. Louis (Mo. 1922) 241 S. W. 428; Vandiver v. Robert-
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son (1907) 125 Mo. App. 307, 102 S. W. 659; St. Louis Gas-Light
Co. v. St. Louis Gas, etc. Co. (1884) 16 Mo. App. 52.
Section 515. WHEN A RESTRAINT OF TRADE IS UNREASONABLE.
A restraint of trade is unreasonable, in the absence of statutory
authorization or dominant social or economic justification, if it
(a) is greater than is required for the protection of the person
for whose benefit the restraint is imposed, or
(b) imposes undue hardship upon the person restricted, or
(c) tends to create or has for its purpose to create, a monopoly,
or to control prices or to limit production artificially, or
(d) unreasonably restricts the alienation or use of anything
that is a subject of property, or
(e) is based on a promise to refrain from competition and is
not ancillary either to a contract for the transfer of good-
will or other subject of property or to an existing employ-
ment or contract of employment.
Annotation:
The principles underlying this Section are in harmony with
Missouri law. "Dominant social and economic justification"
must explain the legality of an ordinary labor union. See Lohse
Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle (1908) 215 Mo. 421, 114 S. W. 997.
As modified by Clause (a) the effect of the Section is recognized
in Long v. TowI (1868) 42 Mo. 545, the court saying: "A contract
prohibiting one of the parties from carrying on any specific trade
or business, without limit as to time or place, is doubtless void;
such contracts, to be binding, must have reasonable limitations as
to the place. What would be reasonable limitations must greatly
depend on the circumstances of each case. It must appear that
such contract imposes no restraint upon one party that is not
beneficial to the other. The prohibition should not extend any
further than will fully protect the party for whose benefit the
contract is made in his occupation or business. If the prohibition
extends beyond this, it is an unreasonable restraint of trade, and
will render the contract void."
As modified by Clause (b) the effect of the Section is illustrated
by Mallinckrodt Chem. Wks. v. Nemnich (1899) 83 Mo. App. 6,
where a restrictive covenant in a contract of employment was
held void, the court saying: "This class of contracts is always re-
garded with suspicion by the courts, as their effect usually is to
create a monopoly, and before any one of them will be upheld, it
should clearly appear that no monopoly is created by it; that its
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enforcement will not prejudice the public; that it is reasonable
as to time, space and person, not oppressive or injurious, and that
the contract is founded on a good consideration, and that its en-
forcement will be useful and beneficial to the promisee."
As modified by Clause (c) the effect of the Section is illustrated
by many cases cited as illegal bargains in Annotation under Sec-
tion 513. See also: Dietrich v. Cape Brewery Co. (1926) 315
Mo. 507, 286 S. W. 38, agreement to control and limit the retail
ice business at Cape Girardeau; State ex inf. Major v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co. (1911) 237 Mo. 369, 141 S. W. 672, arrange-
ment between competing manufacturers of farm machinery re-
sulting in the creation of one master company is illegal; Lohse
Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle (1908) 215 Mo. 421, 114 S. W. 997,
while the mere organization of a labor union is legal, a union's
institution of a boycott is illegal; State ex rel. Hadley v. Kansas
City Live Stock Exchange (1908) 211 Mo. 181, 109 S. W. 675,
rules of a live stock exchange held to be an illegal restraint of
trade; State ex inf. Crow v. Armour Packing Co. (1903) 173 Mo.
356, 73 S. W. 645, agreement between meat packers to fix prices;
Walsh v. Ass'n of Master Plumbers (1902) 97 Mo. App. 280, 71
S. W. 455, illegal bargains between master plumbers and manu-
facturers of plumbers' supplies giving private right of action to
injured plaintiff.
As modified by Clause (d) the effect of the Section is illustrated
by Kessner v. Phillips (1905) 189 Mo. 515, 88 S. W. 66, a clause
in deed that grantee shall not dispose of property, following an
absolute conveyance in fee simple, is void, on grounds of public
policy. But a condition in a deed that real estate shall not be
"sold, leased or rented to negroes for twenty-five years" is not
void as against public policy. Koehler v. Rowland (1918) 275
Mo. 573, 205 S. W. 217.
As modified by Clause (e) the effect of the Section is recognized
in State ex rel. Youngman v. Calhoun (Mo. App. 1921) 231 S. W.
647, where a restrictive covenant in a contract for the transfer
of a physician's practice was erroneously construed by the trial
court in a way that would have made the restrictive covenant il-
legal.
Section 516. INSTANCES OF REASONABLE RESTRAINTS.
The following bargains do not impose unreasonable restraint of
trade unless effecting, or forming part of a plan to effect, a
monopoly:
(a) A bargain by the transferor of property or of a business
not to compete with the buyer in such a way as to injure
the value of the property or business sold;
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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
(b) A bargain by the buyer or lessee of property or of a busi-
ness not to use it in competition with or to the injury of
the seller or lessor;
(c) A bargain to enter into partnership with an actual or pos-
sible competitor;
(d) A bargain by a partner not to interfere by competition or
otherwise with the business of the partnership while it
continues, or subject to reasonable limitations after his
retirement;
(e) A bargain to deal exclusively with another;
(f) A bargain by an assistant, servant, or agent not to com-
pete with his employer, or principal, during the term of
the employment or agency, or thereafter, within such ter-
ritory and during such time as may be reasonably neces-
sary for the protection of the employer or principal, with-
out imposing undue hardship on the employee or agent.
Annotation:
The principles underlying this Section are in accord with Mis-
souri law.
Clause (a) is illustrated by: Hessel v. Hill (Mo. App. 1931) 38
S. W. (2d) 490, sale of undertaking business at Liberty with re-
strictive covenant against competition and Court used words
"reasonable" and "unreasonable" in construing contract; State
ex rel. Youngman v. Calhoun (Mo. App. 1921) 231 S. W. 647,
physician's home and office sold with restrictive covenant; Counts
v. Medley (1912) 163 Mo. App. 546, 146 S. W. 465, sale of produce
business "at" Rogersville with restrictive covenant which was
violated by competition in another town one and one-half miles
away, the court saying "common sense and good faith" are char-
acteristics of all interpretations; Mitchell v. Branham (1904)
104 Mo. App. 480,79 S. W. 739, sale of saloon at Portageville with
covenant not to compete for three years.
The legality of the bargain described in Clause (b) is recog-
nized in Fleming v. Mulloy (1910) 143 Mo. App. 309, 127 S. W.
105, where the owner of property at Monett promised to "sell or
rent" the property "only to parties who agree to buy and handle
Anheuser-Busch beer" when the promisee was the exclusive
agent at Monett for said beer.
The soundness of Clause (c) is apparent from the decision in
Denny v. Guyton (1931) 327 Mo. 1030, 40 S. W. (2d) 562, al-
though the contract was for a joint adventure rather than a strict
partnership. See also Skrainka v. Scharringhausen (1880) 8 Mo.
App. 522.
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The principle of Clause (d) is recognized in Southwest Pump &
Machinery Co. v. Forslund (1930) 225 Mo. App. 262, 29 S. W.
(2d) 165, the court saying: "The good will of the partnership
business conveyed to the company by defendant and his partners,
and its increment, became a part and parcel of the assets of the
corporation", and defendant was enjoined from competing with
the corporation that succeeded the partnership.
Clause (e) is illustrated by Standard Fireproofing Co. v. St.
Louis Fireproofing Co. (1903) 177 Mo. 559, 76 S. W. 1008, bar-
gain for exclusive right to use and vend in a limited territory a
certain patent process for constructing floor tiling supported by
promise not to use any other "similar" construction, is not against
public policy and is a valid contract. See also Wiggins Ferry Co.
v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (1881) 73 Mo. 389, valid contract of rail-
road to make use of one ferry only at St. Louis.
Clause (f) is illustrated by: Athletic Tea Co. v. Cole (Mo. App.
1929) 16 S. W. (2d) 735, employee's valid agreement not to en-
gage in competitive business at town of Imperial for one year
after termination of employment; Garlichs Agency Co. v. Ander-
son (Mo. App. 1920) 226 S. W. 978, agent bound by bargain not
to engage in insurance business for five years after end of fifteen
year term of employment. The principle of this Clause was
recognized but held inapplicable to facts in Mallinckrodt Chem.
Wks. v. Nemnich (1899) 83 Mo. App. 6, the words "unreason-
able" and "reasonable" appearing in the court's opinion and also
in the dissenting opinion.
Section 517. BARGAIN TO STIFLE COMPETITION IN COMPETI-
TIVE BIDDING.
A bargain not to bid at an auction, or any public competition for
a sale or contract, having as its primary object to stifle compe-
tition, is illegal.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. In Miltenberger
v. Morrison (1866) 39 Mo. 71, after describing a possible secret
combination to prevent the attendance of bidders at an auction
sale, the court said: "Such arrangements are held to render the
sale fraudulent and void, as a fraud upon the rights of the vendor
and as against public policy." In Engelman v. Skrainka (1883)
14 Mo. App. 438, where a promise to refrain from bidding for
public work was held unenforceable, the court said: "It is an
uniform rule, founded on public policy, that any contract, the
necessary effect of which is to stifle competition in bidding at pub-
lic or private sales, or at lettings of public or private work, is
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void." Auction sales of land were set aside because violative of
the principle of this Section in the following cases: Vannoy v.
DuvaZl Trust Co. (Mo. 1930) 29 S. W. (2d) 692; Durfee v. Moran
(1874) 57 Mo. 374; Neal v. Stone (1855) 20 Mo. 294; Wooton v.
Hinkle (1855) 20 Mo. 290. Bargains were held unenforceable in
the following cases: Springer v. Kleinsorge (1884) 83 Mo. 152,
land; Hook v. Turner (1856) 22 Mo. 333, land; Pendleton v. As-
bury (1904) 104 Mo. App. 723, 78 S. W. 651, public printing. The
principle was fully considered but held inapplicable to facts in
Vette v. Hackman (1922) 292 Mo. 138, 237 S. W. 802.
Section 518. DIVISIBLE PROMISES IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
Where a promise in reasonable restraint of trade in a bargain
has added to it a promise in unreasonable restraint, the former
promise is enforceable unless the entire agreement is part of a plan
to obtain a monopoly; but if full performance of a promise indi-
visible in terms, would involve unreasonable restraint, the prom-
ise is illegal and is not enforceable even for so much of the per-
formance as would be a reasonable restraint.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. "The rule is, that
where the condition of a bond is entire and the whole be against
law, it is void; but where the condition consists of several differ-
ent parts, and some of them are lawful and the others not, it is
good for so much as is lawful, and void for the rest." Presbury
v. Fisher (1853) 18 Mo. 50. The principle was applied as a rule
of decision in: Peltz v. Eichele (1876) 62 Mo. 171, sale of match
business with restrictive covenants, some valid and some invalid;
Pope-Turbo v. Bedford (1910) 147 Mo. App. 692, 127 S. W. 426,
bargain for instruction supported in part by a valid promise and
in part by an invalid promise.
Section 519. COLLATERAL EFFECT OF BARGAIN IN RESTRAINT OF
TRADE.
The fact that one is a party to a previous illegal contract, agree-
ment or combination with others, restraining competition in that
business, does not invalidate a subsequent bargain by him that is
neither in furtherance of an attempt to obtain a monopoly nor
otherwise illegal; nor is a party to such a previous illegal contract
or agreement deprived of legal protection of his property in the
business.
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Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Federal law. Connolly v. Union
Sewer Pipe Co. (1902) 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. Ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431,
was a suit to collect price for sewer pipe purchased by defendants
and the defense was an allegation that plaintiff was part of a com-
bination in illegal restraint of trade. The court said: "Assum-
ing, as defendants contend, that the alleged combination was il-
legal if tested by the principles of the common law, still it would
not follow that they could, at common law, refuse to pay for pipe
bought by them under special contracts with the plaintiff." The
case also held that the defense was not allowable under the Fed-
eral Anti-trust Act.
This Section is not inconsistent with Missouri common law,
but is at variance with Missouri statutory law in so far as the lat-
ter is applicable to certain contracts. By the express terms of
R. S. Mo. 1929, Section 8706, a corporation violating the anti-
trust statute may "forfeit all or any part of the property of such
corporation". By the express terms of R. S. Mo. 1929, Section
8709, "any purchaser of any article or commodity from any indi-
vidual, company or corporation transacting business contrary to"
the Missouri statute "shall not be liable for the price or payment
of such article or commodity". This defense was successfully
relied upon in Heim Brewing Co. v. Belinder (1902) 97 Mo. App.
64, 71 S. W. 691. See also National Lead Co. v. Grote Paint Co.
(1899) 80 Mo. App. 247. But the defense is not available when
interstate commerce is involved because the statute applies only
to transactions "within this State". First National Bank v. Mis-
souri Glass Co. (1912) 169 Mo. App. 374, 152 S. W. 378.
It should be noted that the Missouri Anti-trust Statute is in the
nature of a criminal statute and is strictly construed. State ex rel.
Star Pub. Co. v. Associated Press (1901) 159 Mo. 410, 60 S. W.
91, statute is "highly penal". Those sections of the statute which
specify the wrongs condemned are so phrased that they do not
apply to bargains restricting professional and other personal
services. See case last above cited, business of gathering and
distributing news is one of mere personal service and beyond the
scope of the statute. However, by Missouri common law such a
bargain is sometimes said to be in restraint of trade, and may be
legal or illegal according to circumstances. In State ex rel.
Youngman v. Calhoun (1921) Mo. App. 231 S. W. 647, a re-
strictive covenant between physicians was expressly termed by
the court a contract "in restraint of trade and personal liberty"
but, when strictly construed, was upheld as legal. In Harelson V.
Tyler (1920) 281 Mo. 383, 219 S. W. 908, the by-laws of a volun-
tary association of hay dealers, as construed and acted upon by
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the association, were expressly held not to violate the statute but
were the basis for a civil conspiracy at common law.
TOPIC C. WAGER.
Section 520. DEFINITION OF AND ILLEGALITY OF A WAGER.
A bargain in which a promisor undertakes that, upon the ex-
istence or happening of a condition he will render a performance
(a) for which there is no agreed exchange, and
(b) which does not indemnify or exonerate the promisee or a
beneficiary of the bargain for a loss caused by the ex-
istence or happening of the condition
is a wager and is illegal.
Annotation:
Statutes. The Chapter on Gaming and Gambling Contracts
in R. S. Mo. 1929, Sections 3005 to 3013, relates chiefly to matters
of procedure and is chiefly designed to discourage wagering by
creating and increasing civil liability of persons who assist in
wagering activities. More than one hundred sections of R. S.
Mo. 1929 relate to criminal aspects of wagering.
"Agreed exchange" is a new and useful technical term intro-
duced by this Restatement and explained in Section 266 thereof.
There may be such a thing as (1) an "agreed exchange" which is
conditional on an uncertain event. (2) A conditional contract
of indemnity is not an agreed exchange because the subject mat-
ter of the contract is a risk of loss-something which is hypo-
thetical and not actual. See Section 292. (3) A conditional
contract for the gratuitous benefit of a third person is not an
agreed exchange so far as the third person is concerned, and is
not necessarily a contract of indemnity. See Section 266.
This definition of a wager is carefully phrased so as to exclude
from the domain of illegality: (1) above, (2) above, and (3)
above. For an illustration of (1) above, see Connell v. Hudson
(1893) 53 Mo. App. 418, a contract whereby A agreed to give and
B agreed to take, for a certain steer, a sum of money equal to the
amount of the unascertained loss which B had sustained on cer-
tain other steers shipped to market by B, and held this was not a
wagering contract; it was a conditional contract for an agreed
exchange. For an illustration of (2) above, consider any legiti-
mate fire insurance policy where an owner insures his own prop-
erty. See Worth v. German Ins. Co. (1896) 64 Mo. App. 583.
For an illustration of (3) above, consider any legitimate life in-
surance policy where a man insures his own life, paying the
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premiums with his own funds, for the gratuitous benefit of
another person. See Lee v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (1916)
195 Mo. App. 40, 189 S. W. 1195.
This Section 520 is in accord with modern Missouri law, al-
though by earliest Missouri law a gambling contract was legal in
the absence of statute. Waddle v. Loper (1826) 1 Mo. 635. Il-
legal wagers are illustrated by many kinds of bargains. Election
bets: Hickerson v. Benson (1843) 8 Mo. 8, bet on Harrison-Van
Buren presidential election void by Missouri common law regard-
less of statute; Dooley v. Jackson (1904) 104 Mo. App. 21, 78
S. W. 330, bet on a primary election void on common law prin-
ciples. For civil liability statute on election bets, see R. S. Mo.
1929, Section 3011. For criminal liability statute on election bets,
see R. S. Mo. 1929, Section 4302. Insurance policies where in-
surable interest is absent: Whitmore v. Supreme Lodge Knights
of Honor (1890) 100 Mo. 36, 13 S. W. 495, cousinship alone is not
insurable interest; Singleton v. St. Louis Mut. Ins. Co. (1877) 66
Mo. 63, uncle-nephew relationship alone is not insurable interest;
Williams v. Peoples Life & Ace. Ins. Co. (1931) 224 Mo. App.
1229, 35 S. W. (2d) 922, sister-in-law of insured does not neces-
sarily have insurable interest even if contract is small industrial
policy; Reynolds v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1901) 88 Mo. App. 679,
adult brothers do not necessarily have mutual insurable interests.
Card games: Laytham v. Agnew (1879) 70 Mo. 48, statutory
action to recover losses at poker; Clark v. King (1914) 178 Mo.
App. 381, 162 S. W. 669, suit on stated account defeated by allega-
tion of card debt; Crooks v. McMahon (1892) 48 Mo. App. 48,
statutory action to recover losses. Racing bets: Shropshire v.
Glascock (1837) 4 Mo. 536, action to collect bet on horse race de-
feated by proof of facts; Swaggard v. Hancock (1887) 25 Mo.
App. 596, statutory action to recover money lost on foot race.
For cases of wagering in the guise of produce exchange trans-
actions, see Annotation under Section 523.
Section 521. AN AGREEMENT FOR A PRIZE AS A WAGER.
An accepted offer of a prize to the winner in a competition, suc-
cess in which does not depend on a fortuitous event, is not a wager,
if the promisor does not compete for the prize.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. In Treacy v.
Chinn (1899) 79 Mo. App. 648, the seller of a race horse was to
receive balance of agreed purchase price when the horse won a
race, and when horse won the race and buyer received prize, seller
was permitted to recover balance of price, although buyer de-
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fended on ground of illegality. The case approved the follow-
ing: "A premium is a reward or recompense for some act done;
a wager is a stake upon an uncertain event. In a premium it is
known who is to give before the event; in a wager it is not known
till after the event." Contrast with the foregoing Shropshire v.
Glascock (1837) 4 Mo. 536, where the promisor by his original
agreement was himself to take part in a horse race for prizes
promised, and when sued on his promise pleaded illegality and
won the case.
Section 522. SPECULATIVE CONTRACTS THAT ARE NOT WAGERS.
An agreement is not one for wagering because of the fact that it
(a) provides for the purchase or sale of securities, or other
commodities on a margin, the remainder of the necessary
capital being advanced by a broker or other person, or
(b) provides for the purchase or sale at a future date of se-
curities or other commodities, or
(c) gives an option to one of the parties to purchase or sell se-
curities or other commodities.
Annotation:
Statutes. An Act of 1887 (Laws of 1887, page 171), subse-
quently modified, and now known as R. S. Mo. 1929, Sections 4324
to 4329, has changed the common law of speculative contracts in
Missouri. But these statutory provisions apply only to Missouri
contracts, and not to contracts which although made in Missouri
are to be performed in New York or Chicago. The law govern-
ing such contracts is the common law, which is the law on this
point in New York and Illinois. Edwards Brokerage Co. v.
Stevenson (1901) 160 Mo. 516, 61 S. W. 617, New York contract;
Gordon v. Andrews (1927) 222 Mo. App. 609, 2 S. W. (2d) 809,
Illinois contract; Atwater v. Edwards Brokerage Co. (1910) 147
Mo. App. 436, 126 S. W. 823, New York contract. As a result of
this ruling, there are many Missouri cases involving speculative
contracts, decided since 1887, which are expositions of the com-
mon law without regard to the Act of 1887. Before 1887 all
speculative contracts in Missouri were decided by the common
law. Williams ,p. Tiedemann (1878) 6 Mo. App. 269. The dis-
tinctive features of the Act of 1887 will be considered in Annota-
tion under Section 523. For history of the Act of 1887 and modi-
fications, see Connor v. Black (1893) 119 Mo. 126, 24 S. W. 184.
This Section 522 is in accord with the common law as an-
nounced by the courts of Missouri.
Clause (a). Illustrative cases: Claiborne Com. Co. v. Stirlen
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(Mo. App. 1924) 262 S. W. 387, money advanced by grain broker
for account of his customer; Gaylord v. Duryea (1902) 95 Mo.
App. 574, 69 S. W. 607, credit extended by stock broker for ac-
count of customer; Williams v. Tiedemann (1878) 6 Mo. App. 269,
money advanced by cotton factor.
Clause (b). Illustrative cases: Gordon v. Andrews (1927) 222
Mo. App. 609, 2 S. W. (2d) 809, December contract for delivery
of corn during month of May following; Deierling v. Sloop
(1896) 67 Mo. App. 446, June contract for January delivery of
corn.
Clause (c). The possible legality of option contracts was recog-
nized in Crawford v. Spencer (1887) 92 Mo. 498, 4 S. W. 713 and
Lane v. Logan Grain Co. (1904) 105 Mo. App. 215, 79 S. W. 722.
For an option sale illegal because of its wagering nature, see
Waterman v. Buckland (1876) 1 Mo. App. 45.
This Section is in accord with Missouri statutory law as ap-
plied to Missouri contracts, provided neither party to the con-
tract intends the legitimate common law contract to be a mere
scheme for gambling. See Annotation under Section 523.
Section 523. BARGAIN TO SETTLE FOR DIFFERENCES IN MARKET
PRICES.
(1) A bargain purporting to be for purchase and sale is a
wager if it is part of the bargain that no actual delivery of the
subject matter shall be made, and that settlement between the
parties shall be made on the basis of differences in market prices.
But an undisclosed intention of one or both parties to a bargain
does not invalidate it.
(2) A bargain for the purchase and sale of securities or com-
modities, originally legal, is not made illegal by a subsequent
agreement between the parties to discharge their rights and
duties by a payment based on the difference between the market
price at the time of the original bargain and that at the time of
the subsequent agreement.
Annotation:
Subsection (1) is in accord with the common law as expounded
by Missouri courts both before and after the Act of 1887 now
known as R. S. Mo. 1929, Sections 4324 to 4329. See Annotation
under Section 522. The distinctive feature of the Act of 1887, as
applied to contracts, is this. While at common law a speculative
contract involving margins, futures or options, was not a wager
unless both parties intended that there should be no actual de-
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liveries but merely a settlement in cash based on fluctuations in
price, under the Missouri Statutes the transaction is illegal and
void if either party so intends, even if the other party is ignorant
of such intention. It follows that the first sentence of this Sub-
, section of Section 523 is in accord with Missouri law, but the
second sentence is at variance with Missouri law. In Johnson v.
Kaune (1886) 21 Mo. App. 22, there was a purported sale of hogs
for future delivery in Missouri and both parties intended no
actual delivery but a mere settlement of differences. The trans-
action was a wager by common law and of course would also be a
wager under present statutory law. Price v. Barnes' Estate
(1923) 300 Mo. 216, 254 S. W. 33, was a suit by a broker on a
protracted margin account for grain bought and sold in St.
Louis. Plaintiff probably intended deliveries but the jury found
that defendant's testator did not intend deliveries and so under
modern Missouri law the alleged contract was void. This case
makes clear the variance between the Restatement and modern
Missouri law. See also: MeVean v. Wehmeier (1923) 215 Mo.
App. 587, 256 S. W. 1085, bargain illegal because at least one
party intended no delivery; Scott v. Brown (1893) 54 Mo. App.
606, bargain illegal because both parties intended no delivery;
Kent v. Miltenberger (1883) 13 Mo. App. 503, showing harmony
between Restatement and law of Missouri prior to 1887.
Subsection (2) is in accord with Missouri law. "It may some-
times happen that when the time arrives for performance, the
seller, not having the goods on hand, finds that he must pay a
higher price for them than that which his vendee has agreed to
pay. The vendee, although entitled to actual delivery, is entitled
to waive it, provided he can realize the same mercantile benefit
that would accrue from the receipt of the goods and a sale of
them at the market price. This may be effected by a settlement
of differences with his vendor, who then pays him the amount of
the net rise, instead of procuring and turning over the property.
no taint is thrown upon the original contract, which con-
templated actual transfer and delivery." Williams v. Tiedemann
(1878) 6 Mo. App. 269.
Section 524. RECOVERY OF MONEY DEPOSITED WITH STAKE-
HOLDER.
Where money is deposited with a stakeholder by parties to a
wager, either party can recover the money deposited by him even
after the happening of the condition upon which it was agreed
that the money should be paid to the other party. Under no cir-
cumstances can either party recover more from the stakeholder;
and the stakeholder is discharged from all duty if he pays the
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winner of a wager before receiving notice of repudiation thereof
by the loser.
Annotation:
R. S. Mo. 1929, Section 3012, relates specifically to the liability
of a stakeholder when knowingly the custodian of money bet in a
manner declared "gaming" by Missouri Statutes. There is also
a broader common law liability of a stakeholder, which is often
available when the statutory liability is not available. For im-
portant differences between the statutory liability and the com-
mon law liability of a stakeholder, see: Dooley v. Jackson (1904)
104 Mo. App. 21, 78 S. W. 330; White v. Gilleland (1902) 93 Mo.
App. 310; Weaver v. Harlan (1892) 48 Mo. App. 319.
This Section 524, when compared with Missouri law, exhibits
one clear feature of variance: By the Restatement a stakeholder
is liable after the event bet upon if notified by the loser to return
the deposit before actual payment has been made to the winner,
but by Missouri common law the stakeholder is not liable to the
loser if notice of repudiation is not made until after the event
even if the money is not yet delivered to the winner. This was an
express holding in Dooley v. Jackson (1904) 104 Mo. App. 21, 78
S. W. 330, a common law action because facts showed that the
statute did not apply. In Cutshall v. McGowan (1903) 98 Mo.
App. 702, 73 S. W. 933, a similar decision was made and the Mis-
souri rule was said to be based upon Lord Mansfield's view of the
common law.
When the action against a stakeholder is not based upon com-
mon law liability but upon statutory liability, then Missouri law
on this point is in harmony with the Restatement. Vandolah v.
McKee (1903) 99 Mo. App. 342, 73 S. W. 233; Weaver v. Harlan
(1892) 48 Mo. App. 319.
Perhaps there is another feature of variance. The Restate-
ment says that a party to a bet can never recover from the stake-
holder more than was deposited by such party. In Wimer v.
Pritchartt (1852) 16 Mo. 252, the winner of a bet sued the loser
(who never attempted to repudiate) and, garnishing the stake-
holder, was entitled to judgment against the latter for the total
of both deposits. This case suggests ,variance. But in Hayden
v. Little (1865) 35 Mo. 418, the winner of a bet tried to recover in
a direct action against the stakeholder money deposited by the
other party to the bet and already returned after repudiation,
and plaintiff lost the suit. This case suggests accord.
In all other aspects this Section 524 seems to be in accord with
Missouri law. See cases already cited in this Annotation and
also Humphreys v. Magee (1850) 13 Mo. 435, where there was
repudiation of a bet on a horse race before the result of the race
was determined.
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Section 525. RECOVERY OF MONEY LENT FOR WAGERING.
(1) A promise to repay money lent for the purpose of being
used for wagering is illegal; but knowledge that money lent will
be used for that purpose does not make a promise to repay it il-
legal.
(2) A promise to repay money lent for the purpose of paying
losses previously incurred in wagering is not illegal.
Annotation:
This entire Section is in accord with Missouri law. In Barn-
hardt v. Strickland (Mo. App. 1928) 8 S. W. (2d) 1079, a case on
doubtful facts was remanded for a new trial and the remanding
court said: "If plaintiff loaned defendant money solely to pay
losses already suffered in a gambling deal forbidden by the
statute, and not to be in any way used to continue or keep alive a
pending transaction of that character, she could recover, even
though she knew the purposes for which the money was to be
used. But if she loaned money to defendant, to be used in 'play-
ing the market', as plaintiff expressed it, that is, to deal in futures
based on the rise or fall of the market price of any given property
at a given time, and with no intention to deliver the property sold
or receive delivery of property bought, and plaintiff knew at the
time that the money was to be so used, and it was in fact so used,
then she could not recover." (Authorities omitted.)
Additional cases illustrating Subsection (1): Elmore Grain
Co. v. Stonebraker (1919) 202 Mo. App. 81, 214 S. W. 216 suit
on account stated for money advanced to be used in part for illegal
speculation in grain; Saunders v. Baker (1907) 122 Mo. App. 294,
99 S. W. 51, bucket shop loan and "courts will pierce through at-
tempted disguises, no matter how cunningly devised".
Additional cases illustrating Subsection (2): Lokey v. Rudy-
Patrick Seed Co. (Mo. App. 1926) 285 S.W. 1028, money advanced
to pay election bet may be a valid loan; Stewart v. Hutchinson
(1906) 120 Mo. App. 32, 96 S. W. 253, money loaned to pay debt
already incurred in gambling on prices of wheat; Searles v. Lum
(1901) 89 Mo. App. 235, money loaned to pay gambling debt
"after the affair is over". The principle was extended to justify
a successful suit in equity for an accounting after the receipt by
one person of money collected on winning Louisiana lottery tick-
ets owned in part by other persons, the trust agreement having
been made after the drawings. Roselle v. Beckemeir (1896) 134
Mo. 380,35 S. W. 1132.
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